

THE FORENSICS FILES



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THE PFD FILE

Resolved:

On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.

February 2013

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Topic Overview

Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.

The resolutorial question requires students to first identify the interests of the United States. Without identifying the interests of the United States, it is difficult to determine whether the rise of China is beneficial or not beneficial to those interests. In researching, preparing for debating, and laying the foundation for the substantive arguments on this topic, students should ask themselves: “How can we identify what is an interest of the United States?”

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to develop a method for identifying the interests of the United States that is limited in any meaningful way. This is because the word “interests” is very broad. And, because the term “of the United States,” it is unclear *who* in the United States the topic is focused on. Who, in the United States, has interests that we should care about? Most people will assume, generally, that “interests” is very broad and that there is no real way to limit the scope of the topic. However, there is a strategic basis for being able to isolate and define interests more narrowly.

Another interesting phrase is the use of “on balance.” This language appears in the January 2013 topic on the *Citizens United* case. This language usually permits the debaters to argue that the pros and cons of the rise of China should be balanced against each other. Debaters could also use this language to overcome arguments that the Pro side should lose if there is only one way in which the rise of China is not beneficial to the interests of the United States. Instead, the Con side will have to weigh the ways in which the rise of China is not beneficial to US interests against the ways in which the Pro side demonstrates that the rise of China is beneficial to US interests.

Proceeding under the assumption that “interests” will not be defined to limit its scope, there is a wealth of resources on the rise of China. Pundits have speculated about how the rise of China would affect the United States for the past several decades. And as China has risen, we have seen the concrete effects of the rise of China on the US. As you might expect, those with radical positions like China will start war with the US or vice versa have been wrong, at least so far. However, this does not mean that one country will not try to assert military dominance over the other at some point in the future. But what we have seen, instead, is that the two countries actually have a very good, strong relationship, that is characterize by small, diplomatic fights. However, there have been growing concerns among both the Chinese government and the US about the future of the relationship.

This topic requires debaters to confront those issues that are sticking points in the US-China relationship at this point. TFF wishes you the best of luck on this topic!

Definitions

Balance

1. To equal or equalize in weight, number, or proportion
2. To weigh in or as if in a balance
3. To bring to a state or position of equipoise
4. To bring into harmony or proportion

Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 12th Edition 2012

Balance

1. To weigh in or as in a balance
2. To compare as to relative importance, value, etc.
3. To counterpoise or counteract; make up for; offset
4. To bring into or keep in a state of equilibrium or equipoise; keep steady; poise
5. To bring into proportion, harmony, etc.
6. To make or be proportionate to

Source: Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed. 2012

Balance

1. To compare as to relative importance, value, etc.
2. To counterpoise
3. A state of equilibrium or parity characterized by cancellation of all forces by equal opposing forces; the power or means to decide
4. A state of bodily equilibrium
5. A harmonious or satisfying arrangement or proportion of parts or elements, as in a design

Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language 2012

Rise

1. To assume an upright position especially from lying, kneeling, or sitting
2. To take up arms
3. To respond warmly
4. To appear above the horizon
5. To move upward
6. To increase in height, size, volume, or pitch

Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 12th Edition 2013

Rise

1. Upward movement; ascent
2. An advance in social status, rank, importance, etc.

Source: Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed. 2013

China

China: officially the People's Republic of China (PRC), is a country in East Asia. It is the world's most populous country, with a population of over 1.3 billion. The PRC is a single-party state governed by the Communist Party of China with its seat of government in the capital city of Beijing.[17][18] It exercises jurisdiction over 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and two mostly self-governing special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau).[19] The PRC also claims Taiwan—which is controlled by the Republic of China (ROC), a separate political entity—as its 23rd province, a claim controversial due to the complex political status of Taiwan and the unresolved Chinese Civil War.

Source: Wikipedia 2013

Beneficial

1. Producing or promoting a favorable result; advantageous.
2. Law Receiving or having the right to receive proceeds or other advantages.

Source: American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 2013

Beneficial

1. sometimes foll by to causing a good result; advantageous
2. entitling a person to receive the profits or proceeds of property

Source: Collins English Dictionary 2013

Beneficial

1. conferring benefits : conducive to personal or social well-being
2. receiving or entitling one to receive advantage, use, or benefit

Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 11th Edition 2013

Interests

1. (business) financial concerns; business
2. to be in the interests of somebody
3. to be to the advantage of somebody
4. to protect somebody 's interests to look after the well-being of somebody
5. to act in the best interests of somebody to act so as to benefit somebody

Source: Collins English Dictionary 2013

Interests

1. something that brings advantages to or affects someone or something

Source: Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2013

United States

1. A republic in the N Western Hemisphere comprising 48 conterminous states, the District of Columbia, and Alaska in North America, and Hawaii in the N Pacific

Source: Infoplease Dictionary 2013

United States

1. Country North America bordering on Atlantic, Pacific, & Arctic oceans; a federal republic capital Washington

Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 12th Edition 2013

United States

1. Country in central North America, consisting of 50 states.

Source: Encarta World English Dictionary, North American Edition 2013

Pro Cases

PRO CASE #1

[Interdependence — 1 of 2]

We believe that the following resolution is true, “Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.” The thesis of our case is that the US and China are economic partners, and as China continues to rise, both countries will benefit. Economic interdependence will also prevent China from challenging the US militarily or in any other adverse way. Thus, the rise of China will be more beneficial to the interests of the US than harmful.

Our first contention is that China and the US are heavily economically interdependent. Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, and Marc Labonte, Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy, wrote for the Congressional Research Service on December 6, 2012¹:

China’s policy of intervening in currency markets to limit the appreciation of its currency against the dollar (and other currencies) has made it the world’s largest and fastest growing holder of foreign exchange reserves, especially U.S. dollars. China has invested a large share of these reserves in U.S. private and public securities, which include long-term (LT) Treasury debt, LT U.S. agency debt, LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term debt. As of June 2011, China was the largest holder of U.S. securities, which totaled \$1.73 trillion. U.S. Treasury securities constitute the largest category of China’s holdings of U.S. securities—these totaled \$1.16 trillion as of September 2012, but were down from their peak of \$1.31 trillion in July 2011.

Second, this interdependence means that China will act in its self-interest to make sure that the US economy prospers. Matthew Pennington wrote an article entitled, “China And US Accept Interdependence” on December 24, 2012²:

The economies of China and the U.S. have become “interdependent and inseparable,” a top Chinese official said after high-level trade talks which were being watched for signs of how the two powers will cooperate after their respective political transitions. Vice Premier Wang Qishan was speaking after the annual U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. Tackling dozens of thorny, detailed trade issues, the two days of talks were short on big outcomes but set an upbeat tone for relations after President Barack Obama's re-election and the elevation of new leaders of China's ruling Communist Party. Wang, who last month was elevated to a spot in the elite seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, said recovery of the world economy in the next five years will be sluggish, so the U.S.-China economic relationship has acquired critical

¹ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf>

² Manila Publishing Bulletin Corporation, <http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/386984/china-and-us-accept-interdependence#.UOuC-YV5lo4>

PRO CASE #1
[Interdependence — 2 of 2]

importance. "Our two countries have to strengthen our economic relationship. We have to come to terms with the fact that we have become interdependent and inseparable," he said.

Finally, interdependence ensures that China will not threaten the US. Yen Tran wrote a paper entitled, "CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE: IMPACTS ON U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF AMERICA IN ASIA" in 2011:³

China has also modernized its military force because Asia became the U.S.'s secondary concern since the terrorist attacks on Sep 11 th , 2001. Currently, no single country in Asia, possibly besides Japan, is capable of catching up with China's advanced and modernized military power (Pollack 329 - 46). However, China is still unable to attack any country because of the high economic interdependences. (The United States, Japan and South Korea are among China's largest export markets and China's exports of goods and services constitute 39.7% of its GDP).

In conclusion, because economic interdependence enhances cooperation and decreases conflict between the US and China, China's rise will be, on balance, beneficial to the interests of the United States. Thus, the resolution is true.

³ www.moreheadstate.edu/uploadedFiles/Sites/Main_Sites/Libra

PRO CASE #2
[Cooperation — 1 of 2]

We believe that the following resolution is true, “Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.” The thesis of our case is that the rise of China will help the US solve international crises.

First, China’s growth will be equal to the US’s growth. So China will not be able to overpower the US. Salvatore Babones, Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney, wrote an article entitled "The Middling Kingdom: The Hype and the Reality of China's Rise" for Foreign Affairs on October 2011:

Like other middle-income countries, China will likely continue to grow slightly faster than Western countries, although not as fast as it did between 1990 and 2010 and with much more volatility. But its population will start to fall soon after 2020, whereas the U.S. population will keep rising. The overall size of China's economy is thus likely to remain roughly equal to that of the United States for the remainder of the twenty-first century.

Second, China is so far behind the US that China could not serious challenge the US. Babones continues:

But given the United States' far greater alliance network and geostrategic position, U.S. hegemony is not threatened by the rise of China. The United States is encircled by long-standing allies (Canada and the countries of western Europe) or stable but weak noncompetitors (Latin America). China's neighbors are a rich and powerful Japan, rising South Korea and Vietnam, giant India and Russia, and a host of failed or failing states in Central and Southeast Asia. The United States reigns supreme over the oceans, the skies, and outer space; China struggles to maintain order within its own territory. China will, and legitimately should, play an increasing role in Asian and world politics, but it is in no position to dominate even Asia, never mind the world. Pundits may relish the opportunity to speculate about a post-American future in which the world has to learn Mandarin, but the facts say not in this century.

PRO CASE #2
[Cooperation — 2 of 2]

Third, the increased strength of China will make it a more effective partner for the US in tackling international issues. G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, wrote an article called The Future of the Liberal World Order for Foreign Affairs in June 2011:

Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

Because China will be unable to challenge the US despite its growth, and because its growth will enable China to be a better international partner for the US, the rise of China is, on balance, in the US's interests.

Con Cases

CON CASE #1

[Nationalism —1 of 2]

We believe that the following resolution is false, “Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.” The thesis of our case is that the rise of China will embolden a nationalist takeover of China. If the nationalists take over, they will continue to threaten the United States regardless of whether it is in China’s self-interests to do so.

First, unchecked nationalism is growing in China. As it gets stronger, the government will capitulate to nationalists’ demands to try to take over Taiwan.

Damian Grammaticas, wrote an article for BBC News, entitled China's rising nationalism troubles West, in 2009:⁴

While US President Barack Obama has been sitting down with China's leaders seeking ever closer co-operation, some observers are concerned as to how China will behave as it gets stronger. Beijing is building up its military forces, while some fear that popular nationalism is a growing and worrying force. China's nationalists are often critical of their own government too, saying it is weak, not doing enough to stand up for China's interests. China's leaders says their nation's rise will be a peaceful one. But US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg recently called on China to reassure other nations about its intentions. One of his predecessors, Susan Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs under President Bill Clinton, goes further. She says the combination of China's growing military and growing popular nationalism presents dangers. "It creates the risk, not a high probability, but a risk, that one day China's leaders could feel that to look strong in the eyes of their public they have to make a threat to Japan or to Taiwan and that they will feel that they cannot back down from that threat without jeopardising their own domestic support or even their own survival in power. So I think that is a very dangerous scenario," she says. Perhaps aware of the dangers of unchecked nationalism, China is trying to control some on the more radical fringe.

Second, as energy resources become more scarce, nationalists will increase pressure on the Chinese government to take action against the US. Grammaticus continues:

"In the future, energy supplies will become more and more scarce. Today each American consumes 10 times as much energy as each Chinese person. So every nation will have to think about their own survival. At that time, nationalism will be the mainstream." It is a vision that will give some in America pause for thought. The US National Intelligence Strategy this year described China as presenting a complex global challenge. A China with a strong nationalist current and a powerful military could be seen as an even more troubling prospect for Washington.

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CON CASE #1
[Nationalism —2 of 2]

Third, conflict over Taiwan would result in a nuclear war. Scott Moore, Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, wrote an article entitled, Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat, in 2006⁵:

However, there is also a widespread belief among analysts that China would be apt to abrogate its NFU pledge in a major crisis, particularly involving Taiwan. This important qualification to consensus on the integrity of the NFU policy crisis reflects a central truth: the deep resonance of the Taiwan issue to Chinese nationalism, and the determination at nearly all levels that Taiwan must not be allowed to become an independent nation.

Because nationalists will act out of desire to make China look strong, rather than what is in the country's self interest, all bets are off. Therefore, the rise of China will be accompanied by dangerous nationalist sentiment that will likely prompt a nuclear war over Taiwan. Thus, the rise of China, on balance, is not beneficial to US interests.

⁵ www.nti.org/analysis/articles/reviewing-chinese-nuclear-threat/

CON CASE #2
[Mearsheimer—1 of 2]

We believe that the following resolution is false, “Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.” The thesis of our case is that the rise of China will result in a US-China war.

First, China’s rise will cause the US and its allies to counterbalance China. John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago , wrote an article called, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All” for The Australian in 2005⁶:

President Bush hopes the Asian giant will be a friendly one, but John Mearsheimer is a pessimist THE question at hand is simple and profound: will China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the US to contain China's power. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has several defining characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in anarchy which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals.

Second, China will counteract counterbalancing by pushing the US out of Asia.
Mearsheimer continues:

China -- whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic -- is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s.

⁶ <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0014.pdf>

CON CASE #2
[Mearsheimer —2 of 2]

Finally, there is already proof in the status quo that China and the US will engage in a destructive security competition as China continues to rise. Mearsheimer concludes:

Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries such as India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers such as Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the US to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Finally, given Taiwan's strategic importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the US, as well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is likely to be an important player in the anti-China balancing coalition, which is sure to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and Washington.

Therefore the resolution is false because the rise of China will result in a war between US and China.

Pro Extensions

iPhone sales prove that China's growth provides growth opportunities for US businesses.

CNN Jan. 6, 2013, U.S. companies betting big in China, Cable News Network,
<http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/news/economy/1204/gallery.us-companies-in-china/>

The Chinese economy is still growing far faster than the United States. These American companies are hoping to seize that opportunity to boost their bottom lines. iPhone fever is finally touching down in China. The country has roughly 1 billion mobile phone subscribers -- the most in the world. It was no surprise then, when in February Apple CEO Tim Cook told investors, "We've been very, very focused on China." Apple's sales in the country have more than quadrupled over the last year alone, totaling \$12 billion in 2011. While U.S. customers still account for more than a third of the company's worldwide sales, China is inching up and now makes up about 12% of Apple's total revenue. Earlier this year when Apple launched the iPhone 4S, the company had to shut down its Beijing and Shanghai stores as scuffles broke out among hundreds of devout fans waiting in line. That's a far cry from 2009, when Apple's launch of the first iPhone in China was generally regarded as a disappointment.

China's growth opens doors for US business growth.

CNN Jan. 6, 2013, Chinese stocks: 'Not for the faint of heart'
money.cnn.com/news/economy/china-world-growth/

With the world's largest population and its rapid industrialization, China offers a wealth of opportunities for companies catering to its rising middle class. For example, only one-third of China's population is online, giving e-commerce and other web 2.0 companies plenty of room to grow.

Even the more competitive sectors will offer growth opportunities for US businesses.

CNN Jan. 6, 2013, Chinese stocks: 'Not for the faint of heart'
money.cnn.com/news/economy/china-world-growth/

The road is a bit more challenging for private oil, gas, telecom and financial services firms, since those industries are largely state run. But given China's overall explosive economic growth, there will probably be select opportunities in those sectors as well.

US companies have a unique opportunity for growth because Chinese companies are not fairing too well.

CNN Jan. 6, 2013, Chinese stocks: 'Not for the faint of heart'
money.cnn.com/news/economy/china-world-growth/

It's been a rough time for some Chinese companies, which have come under fire for questionable accounting practices. While the problems were largely confined to companies that went public through so-called reverse mergers, the fallout was felt broadly by most Chinese companies, with marked stock declines.

China's economic growth is slowing.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

That economy, the world's second largest, has sprinted to prominence over the past three decades with year after year of sustained 10% growth. But China's economic growth has slowed recently. In the third quarter, the government reported GDP expansion of only 7.4%. The economy's performance, while not a disaster, was still the slowest quarterly growth posted in years and underscored concerns about the sustainability of Beijing's model.

Japan and India will counterbalance China.

Amiel Ungar, Japan and India Increase Cooperation to Counterbalance China, November 5, 2012, www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/161699#.UOuGKoV5lo5

Two serious newspapers – the Times of India and the Asahi Shimbun, in separate reports, have emphasized the burgeoning ties between New Delhi and Tokyo prompted by mutual concern over an assertive China. Japan is feeling the brunt of the assertiveness as Chinese ships - for over two weeks - have made forays to challenge Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese ships claim that they are operating in Chinese territorial waters.

The rise of China will be counterbalanced by Western centrism, even if it is not the US that maintains the most power.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations.

Nuclear deterrence ensures that China will rise as an ally to the US, not an enemy.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.)

Even if the US's unipolarity comes to an end, China will rise as a friendly country to the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on. As it faces an ascendant China, the United States should remember that its leadership of the Western order allows it to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices. If it wants to preserve this leadership, Washington must work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order -- making it even easier to join and harder to overturn. U.S. grand strategy should be built around the motto "The road to the East runs through the West." It must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible, giving China greater incentives for integration than for opposition and increasing the chances that the system will survive even after U.S. relative power has declined. The United States' "unipolar moment" will inevitably end. If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph

Not all power transitions lead to war.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

But not all power transitions generate war or overturn the old order. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom ceded authority to the United States without great conflict or even a rupture in relations. From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, Japan's economy grew from the equivalent of five percent of U.S. GDP to the equivalent of over 60 percent of U.S. GDP, and yet Japan never challenged the existing international order. Clearly, there are different types of power transitions. Some states have seen their economic and geopolitical power grow dramatically and have still accommodated themselves to the existing order. Others have risen up and sought to change it. Some power transitions have led to the breakdown of the old order and the establishment of a new international hierarchy. Others have brought about only limited adjustments in the regional and global system. A variety of factors determine the way in which power transitions unfold. The nature of the rising state's regime and the degree of its dissatisfaction with the old order are critical: at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, a liberal country an ocean away from Europe, was better able to embrace the British-centered international order than Germany was. But even more decisive is the character of the international order itself -- for it is the nature of the international order that shapes a rising state's choice between challenging that order and integrating into it

China won't challenge the US because the US's leadership has been characterized not by imperialism but by liberalism.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The postwar Western order is historically unique. Any international order dominated by a powerful state is based on a mix of coercion and consent, but the U.S.-led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial -- and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable. Its rules and institutions are rooted in, and thus reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism. It is expansive, with a wide and widening array of participants and stakeholders. It is capable of generating tremendous economic growth and power while also signaling restraint -- all of which make it hard to overturn and easy to join. It was the explicit intention of the Western order's architects in the 1940s to make that order integrative and expansive.

The open market system guarantees that China won't be a threat to the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.

The US's coalition-based leadership will prevent China from threatening the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -- an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power -- shifts the balance in the order's favor.

The US's rule-based leadership will ensure that China will not threaten the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system.

China will not challenge the US because of globalization and technological cooperation.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past -- making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful.

The US has a significant capacity for accommodating rising powers.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order.

Nuclearization will continue to prevent war-based power transitions in the international arena.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process. The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration.

China is already working within the current Western order.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order. China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great-power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so.

China recognizes that peaceful growth is essential to its economic interests.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system - a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions. China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide. The WTO's multilateral trade principles and dispute-settlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules.

The US has changed its strategies for dealing with China to adapt to its rising power.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, *The Problem With the Pivot* Subtitle: *Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive*, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

And so in 2010, the Obama administration initiated what it called a "pivot" to Asia, a shift in strategy aimed at bolstering the United States' defense ties with countries throughout the region and expanding the U.S. naval presence there. The diplomatic element of the strategy was on display in 2011, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reassured U.S. allies, many of which harbor concerns about China's rise, that "the United States is going to remain a presence in the Pacific for a long time," and the following year, when he promised that the U.S. military would bring "enhanced capabilities to this vital region." Worried that a newly assertive China was becoming a destabilizing force, the White House moved to counter any perceptions of its own weakness by strengthening the U.S. presence in the region.

The US has always overestimated China's military power.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

The truth, however, is that the United States has greatly overestimated China's military capabilities. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has made great strides since 1979, when it was embarrassed by its poor performance in a brief war with Vietnam, its power remains limited. Over the last ten years, the PLA has not deployed any new ships or aircraft that significantly enhanced its ability to challenge U.S. maritime superiority. China's main tool to counter the U.S. Navy and deter an American intervention in Asian conflicts remains a fleet of diesel submarines that has been in service since the mid-1990s. For all the talk of China's naval modernization, the PLA has only just begun constructing a next-generation guided-missile destroyer, the quantity and quality of which will pale in comparison to those of the United States' Aegis-class destroyer fleet. It was only in August 2011 that Beijing launched its first aircraft carrier -- the U.S. military has 11 -- and it was an old and relatively small ship purchased from the Russians.

China's military is still incapable of challenging the US.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

China is developing antiship ballistic missiles that could target U.S. aircraft carriers, but it has not yet mastered the technology to deploy these weapons. And according to the Pentagon's own 2011 report on the Chinese military, less than 30 percent of the PLA's naval surface forces, air forces, and air defense forces and only 55 percent of its submarine fleet could be considered modern. In short, the PLA is still unable to challenge U.S. dominance at sea or upend the balance of power in the region.

China realizes that it's economy is still subject to external pressures.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Over the last few years, Beijing has had more to worry about than its military shortcomings. In late 2008, when Chinese leaders recognized that their country was not immune to the financial tremors rocking the globe, Beijing panicked at the prospect of a spike in domestic unemployment and hastily funded a massive stimulus package of four trillion yuan (about \$570 billion). But this only made things worse, breeding short-term instability and long-term structural imbalances in the economy. The result was that in 2009-10, China experienced the worst economic turmoil since the 1960s, following Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward. Between 2009 and 2010, inflation increased more than tenfold, and in February 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that the worsening inflation resulting from the stimulus could "undermine social stability." By 2009, housing prices in major cities had surpassed the average middle-class monthly income by 20-30 percent, far exceeding the World Bank's suggested ratio. Meanwhile, throughout early 2010, in an attempt to constrain lending, China's central bank repeatedly increased the amount of capital banks were required to hold in reserve. Nonetheless, inflation continued to increase.

The US has been building alliances and military power in Asia to contain Chinese aggression.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Over the last three years, the United States has carried out its largest joint military exercises with South Korea since the Korean War and increased the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. Washington and Seoul have also reached multiple new defense agreements, and earlier this year, the Pentagon announced plans to upgrade U.S. military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, despite the fact that South Korea's military capabilities have vastly improved relative to the those of the increasingly dysfunctional North Korean regime. At the same time, the United States has reinforced its presence in Indochina. Since the early 1990s, successive U.S. administrations had rebuffed Vietnam's desire for more substantial defense ties. Washington understood that if it wanted cooperative relations with Beijing, it would need to acknowledge that China had a far greater strategic stake in the region than the United States.

US and Chinese leaders are cooperating over a variety of issues now.

Henry A. Kissinger, Chair of Kissinger Associates and a former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations Subtitle: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity, Foreign Affairs, April 2012, Lexis

On January 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship." Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, "The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region." Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives.

Con Extensions

China's economy is too reliant on investment to be a reliable source of economic growth for US companies.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

At the heart of these concerns is a set of structural problems, all of which require reforms that the previous party leadership -- divided over policy -- was unable to complete. China's economy is too reliant on investment, a trend that has distorted the country's housing market and placed great emphasis on exports.

China's rise promotes communism as most of their companies are state-owned.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

While regulators have pursued some changes, the rules governing the country's equity markets make raising capital difficult for some businesses. State-owned enterprises, which dominate entire sectors of China's economy, are too frequently the recipients of favorable loans and treatment from the government.

China's government is corrupt. Thus, China is not reliable trading partner.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

There are other problems as well. Even though China has a growing middle class, income inequality is a concern. And the country's top leadership has been embarrassed by a recent wave of scandals involving graft, embezzlement and corruption.

China's transitioning leadership will make its continued rise instable. Thus, we cannot determine if China's continued rise will be in the US interests.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

Still, much remains uncertain. The makeup of the next standing committee is a closely guarded secret. Xi Jinping, a chemical engineer with a prestigious pedigree, is likely to be tapped as the next party boss and president. But even after the committee is named, the deliberations that brought Xi to the top post will remain private. "The transition itself has been absorbing significant amounts of energy," Capital Economics wrote. "There is a chance that policy reform gains fresh momentum once the transition is out of the way."

Whether the rise of China will be good for the US is still an open question.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises?

An emerging China will only be a security threat to the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition.

An increasingly powerful China will replace the US as the most influential country.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order.

A rising China will add to Russian pressures to decrease the influence of the US.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than \$1 trillion at the end of 2006. China's military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, and its diplomacy has extended its reach not just in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Indeed, whereas the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival -- heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power.

History proves that power transitions result in war and conflict. The same will occur with the US and China.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

The danger of power transitions is captured most dramatically in the case of late-nineteenth-century Germany. In 1870, the United Kingdom had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany and a significant military advantage as well; by 1903, Germany had pulled ahead in terms of both economic and military power. As Germany unified and grew, so, too, did its dissatisfactions and demands, and as it grew more powerful, it increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe, and security competition began. In the strategic realignments that followed, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, formerly enemies, banded together to confront an emerging Germany. The result was a European war. Many observers see this dynamic emerging in U.S.-Chinese relations. "If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades," the realist scholar John Mearsheimer has written, "the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war."

Power transitions in international relations historically lead to war.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. As scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have described it, world politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever: long-term changes in the distribution of power give rise to new challenger states, who set off a struggle over the terms of that international order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system -- to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position. These moments are fraught with danger. When a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order. But when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues, and conflict -- perhaps leading to war -- becomes likely.

The rise of China will be violent unless the US radically changes its foreign policy goals.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

Seen in this light, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle with the United States over global rules and leadership. The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States. But that will only happen if the United States sets about strengthening the existing order. Today, with Washington preoccupied with terrorism and war in the Middle East, rebuilding Western rules and institutions might to some seem to be of only marginal relevance. Many Bush administration officials have been outright hostile to the multilateral, rule-based system that the United States has shaped and led. Such hostility is foolish and dangerous. China will become powerful: it is already on the rise, and the United States' most powerful strategic weapon is the ability to decide what sort of international order will be in place to receive it.

China is rejecting the US's liberal world order.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West* Subtitle: *Can the Liberal System Survive?*, Foreign Affairs, February 2008, Lexis

China is pursuing a different strategy: forging a route around the West by constructing an alternative international system in the developing world. The norms of China's parallel political order are alien to those Ikenberry wishes to see preserved. There is a lot of wishful thinking but much less evidence to suggest that China is adopting the political norms that Americans believe define the liberal order.

China has no respect for human rights; thus, its activities demonstrate its rise will not be aligned with US interests.

Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, New Era Foreign Policy Project, University of California, Berkeley, *To the Editor*, Foreign Affairs, June 2008, Lexis

Beijing's foreign policies in the developing world, for example, reject the core liberal notion that the international community has the right and the responsibility to protect the individual. China places sovereign state rights above and beyond obligations to individuals or international organizations. In China's world, states deal with one another only in regard to their economic and security objectives. Human rights, domestic governance rules, and other components of the Western liberal order are off the table. What the Chinese offer as their version of an international system is very different from the one the West has come to accept.

China's growing economic power renders US political pressure useless.

Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, New Era Foreign Policy Project, University of California, Berkeley, To the Editor, Foreign Affairs, June 2008, Lexis

This analysis misses the degree to which the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have, both domestically and internationally, effectively disaggregated economic and political liberalism. They have successfully orchestrated an economic ascendance that allows China to connect to the international economic order on its own terms. China's sheer economic might, in turn, has rendered the country far less susceptible to the political leverage the West has wielded over its economic partners in the past.

China has been using its newfound economic power to sanction other countries.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Ever since the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened up his country's economy in the late 1970s, China has managed to grow in power, wealth, and military might while still maintaining cooperative and friendly relations with most of the world. Until a few years ago, that is, when Beijing seemed to change tack, behaving in a way that alienated its neighbors and aroused suspicion abroad. In December 2009, for example, Beijing's resistance to compromise at the UN Climate Change Conference angered European countries and the United States. Then, following the January 2010 sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan, the Chinese government suspended a senior U.S.-Chinese security dialogue for the first time and announced unprecedented sanctions against U.S. companies with ties to Taiwan (although it is not clear that the sanctions caused meaningful damage). In July of that year, Beijing angrily protested plans for U.S.-South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, and in September, it excoriated Japan for detaining the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that had rammed a Japanese coast guard ship in disputed waters. To cap off this series of unsettling episodes, Beijing voiced excessive hostility toward democratic countries and imposed economic sanctions on Norway after the Nobel Prize committee awarded the Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo the Peace Prize in October.

China has been using its new power to alienate other countries.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

In a few short months, China had managed to undo much of what it had gained through years of talk about its "peaceful rise." At the time, many analysts interpreted China's new belligerence as a sign of the country's growing confidence. Writing in The Washington Post, John Pomfret noted that Beijing was evincing "a new triumphalist attitude." China was on the rise, the thinking went, and its newfound power had convinced its leaders that they could shape events in Asia as never before.

China's leaders' insecurities result in the use of the countries power to promote nationalist policies.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Beijing's tough diplomacy stemmed not from confidence in its might -- China's leaders have long understood that their country's military remains significantly inferior to that of the United States -- but from a deep sense of insecurity born of several nerve-racking years of financial crisis and social unrest. Faced with these challenges, and no longer able to count on easy support based on the country's economic growth, China's leaders moved to sustain their popular legitimacy by appeasing an increasingly nationalist public with symbolic gestures of force.

Internal failures cause the Chinese government to appease hard-line nationalists.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

In a 2009 riot in Shishou, in Hubei Province, 70,000 people confronted police officers in what the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government-affiliated think tank, considered to be "the most serious street riot" since 1949. The social scientists at the academy argued that the increase in violent crime and civil disorder in 2009 reflected greater rural unemployment and the resulting growth of an idle, marginalized population. And in 2010, Guo Binsheng, a senior editor at the official Xinhua News Agency, warned that China had entered a period of "outstanding social conflict" and that "the task of stability . . . will be very arduous." Faced with this growing unrest and needing to stave off a real crisis of legitimacy, Beijing had no choice but to appease a growing cadre of hard-line nationalists who wanted to project a tough image of China to the world.

Hardline nationalists believe that China becomes stronger when the US becomes weaker.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

The Chinese Communist Party has long promoted nationalism to sustain its legitimacy, but during the recent decades of rapid growth, the Chinese public focused more on economic advancement than on politics. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, however, Beijing could no longer simply rely on economic success. Meanwhile, nationalism was on the rise. Even though the party's top policymakers understood the country's deficiencies, many Chinese nonetheless believed that the global financial crisis signaled the culmination of China's rise to great-power status. In 2008 and 2009, as the United States fell into a recession, China's economy grew by ten percent. And the Chinese leadership's touting of the PLA's successes, including its antipiracy missions, space program, and tests of advanced military aircraft, suggested to the public that China was catching up to the United States and should thus adopt a more assertive foreign policy.

Anti-American sentiment is increasing among the Chinese people.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Following the January 2010 announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Chinese opinion leaders and increasingly vocal Internet users argued for sanctions against the U.S. defense companies that had participated in the deal. Rear Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA's National Defense University, called for China to "give a lesson to the U.S. government that harming others will harm yourself." Similarly, Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary-general of the China Society of Military Science, insisted that it was time to "settle accounts" with the United States. Some Chinese Internet users on the Web sites of the People's Daily and QQ, a popular instant-messaging program, quickly followed their lead, demanding that China break diplomatic ties with the United States and begin exporting weapons to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

China's rise will weaken US alliances.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, *The Problem With the Pivot* Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, *Foreign Affairs*, December 2012, Lexis

But following China's uncompromising stances of 2009 and 2010, Washington faced a credibility problem: its East Asian allies questioned whether the United States, mired in its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, could contend with a seemingly more confident and capable China. Largely to assuage these fears, the United States set out to prove that it could maintain the balance of power in the region. The Obama administration's pivot has included a doubling down on the efforts of previous administrations. Washington expanded its joint naval exercises with Japan to prepare for the defense of disputed islands, reached new agreements to sell arms to the Philippines, and, most recently, in April 2012, agreed to send U.S. marines to Australia.

China has strengthened its relationship with North Korea to challenge US power.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, *The Problem With the Pivot* Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, *Foreign Affairs*, December 2012, Lexis

When Washington got directly involved in China's sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China's land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening. As might be expected from a great power faced with a deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past. One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported more of North Korea's mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability. The PLA has also put pressure on those of China's neighbors that have boosted their defense cooperation with the United States.

China has demonstrated that it will continue to threaten US allies.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Similarly, China's maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there.

President Obama's policies have only made China more aggressive.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters -- the other claimants have been active in these waters for years -- and the PLA formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands. As all these events suggest, the Obama administration's pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone.

China's historically challenged the US after each time the US has attempted to exert influence over China.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

This nationalist outcry led Beijing to escalate tensions with Japan. At least 14 Chinese government surveillance ships accompanied hundreds of Chinese fishing boats to the islands, where they entered Japanese-claimed territorial seas. Meanwhile, China has challenged U.S. interests beyond East Asia, forsaking the cooperation that the two countries had managed to sustain in the years leading up to the pivot. Whereas between 2006 and 2010, China voted for five UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, in 2012 Beijing threatened to veto sanctions on Iranian oil exports. After the United States, European countries, and Japan independently agreed to sanction Iranian oil exports in January 2012, Beijing reached new agreements with Tehran to purchase Iranian oil.

The rise of China will cause the US to lose its position of power.

Kira Zalan, The Rise of China and the Global Future of the U.S., US News & World Report, January 3, 2013, www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/01/03/the-rise-of-china-and-the-global-future-of-the-us

According to the National Intelligence Council, the global balance of power will shift significantly by 2030. China will likely become the largest economy in the world. Asia will surpass Europe and North America in population size, GDP, military spending, and technological investment. With the coming diffusion of power, the United States is expected to become "first among equals," rather than a superpower. Jonathan Moyer, interim associate director at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver, provided some of the forecasts behind the NIC's Global Trends 2030 report. Moyer recently spoke to U.S. News about the implications of the coming power shifts and how they might influence U.S. policy.

Pro Blocks

A/T Nationalists

1. Their evidence about nationalists taking over the government is mere speculation. There's explanation for how there is a takeover.
2. Their evidence about nationalism taking over isn't specific, so there is a low probability of nationalism changing the course of Chinese politics. They don't provide any specific scenarios at all.
3. Chinese nationalists are just posturing. They won't actually support an attack on the US. Rana Foroohar , "Fear of China's Missiles (and Money) Is Overblown" Time Magazine, December 30, 2010
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2040067,00.html

Certainly, there's reason to pay attention to China's more assertive stance in global affairs. Growing prosperity and confidence has led Beijing to challenge the West's hegemony on everything from trade to technology to currency to security. Certainly, the rise of an affluent young Chinese middle class has led to more nationalism across the board. A recent best-selling book called "The China Dream" argues for a Chinese military build up in preparation for a coming conflict with the U.S. Yet all the posturing on both sides has obscured a few key facts. First and foremost, China worries a lot more about internal stability than external muscle. Beijing spends much, much more on maintaining domestic obedience (in the form of police, censors, etc) than it does on its military. Deng Xiaoping's wisdom about China having plenty to do at home before it tackles the world at large still holds, perhaps more than ever.

Pro Blocks

A/T China will be aggressive.

1. Even if China is aggressive in some foreign policy aspects, there's no reason why China would be overly-aggressive and initiate a substantial military or economic conflict with the United States.

2. China faces too many hurdles to be an aggressive country, at least not for over thirty years.

Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status" Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 Lexis

According to China's strategic plans, it will take another 45 years -- until 2050 -- before it can be called a modernized, medium-level developed country. China will face three big challenges before it gets there. As described above, China's shortage of resources poses the first problem. The second is environmental: pollution, waste, and a low rate of recycling together present a major obstacle to sustainable development. The third is a lack of coordination between economic and social development.

3. China's peaceful rise will be guaranteed by its opening of its economy.

Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status" Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 Lexis

China's peaceful rise will further open its economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for -- rather than posing a threat to -- the international community. A few figures illustrate China's current contribution to global trade: in 2004, China's imports from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations increased by 33.1 percent, from Japan by 27.3 percent, from India by 80 percent, from the European Union by 28 percent, and from the United States by 31.9 percent.

Pro Blocks

A/T China's rise will hurt the US economic competitiveness.

1. There's no reason why China's rise will necessarily trade off with the US's economic well-being.
2. Even if China becomes a bigger economy than the US, this does not mean that the US's economy will get worse.
3. China's economic growth is mutually beneficial to the US.

Kimberly Amadeo, How Does China Influence the U.S. Dollar?, August 13, 2009, useconomy.about.com/b/2009/08/13/how-does-china-influence-the-u-s-dollar.htm#comment-18828

The only way China can keep the yuan artificially low is to promise to redeem dollars for yuan at the fixed rate. To do so, it must keep a good supply of dollars in reserve. Instead of holding dollar bills, it holds U.S. Treasuries, which it can quickly sell for dollars. As China's economy grows, it must buy more and more U.S. currency to meet the growing number of yuan.

Pro Blocks

A/T China's rise will increase human rights abuses.

1. There's no reason why human rights abuses in other countries directly hurts US interests.
2. There's no warrant for why China's growth will result in more human rights abuses instead of just a continuation of current human rights problems.
3. The US counteracts Chinese human rights abuses in two ways. First, the US's pressures China regularly about its human rights records. Second, the US helps can counteract Chinese human rights abuses by improving human rights in other countries.

Con Blocks

A/T Growth Opportunities for US Businesses

1. This actually supports the Con side. US businesses will seize opportunities in China, but this will encourage them to commit their loyalties to China, and the Chinese government not the US.

2. Just because there will be business opportunities in China doesn't mean that the US companies will necessarily benefit from those opportunities. This advantage is speculative at best.

3. China is heavily regulated by the government. There is no guarantee that the Chinese government will not prohibit US businesses from operating in China.

4. China's economy is too reliant on investment to be a reliable source of economic growth for US companies.

Charles Riley, CNN Money, November 6, 2012, Economy central for China's new leadership, money.cnn.com/2012/11/04/news/economy/china-political-transition/index.html

At the heart of these concerns is a set of structural problems, all of which require reforms that the previous party leadership -- divided over policy -- was unable to complete. China's economy is too reliant on investment, a trend that has distorted the country's housing market and placed great emphasis on exports.

Con Blocks

A/T China is a rational actor.

1. Just because China has rational actors now does not mean that those rational actors could make an error in calculation and decide to attack the US.
2. China's rational actors may be taken over by nationalists who are not rational.
3. The assumption that China has rational actors is unwarranted and conditional.
Zhiyu Shi, Chi-Yu Shih, China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy, pg 115

For years China insisted that US-Taiwan relations were the main obstacle to the improvement of Sino-US relations. Studies that deal with the triangular relationship are for the most part policy-oriented. Four outstanding works that analyze the Chinese strategic calculus all assume that there is a rational actor, although the assumption is, to various degrees, conditional. As rationality analyses, they assume that decisionmakers consciously examine the pros and cons of any action and that policymaking is based on such a calculation.

Con Blocks

A/T Interdependence

1. China isn't always focused on economic concerns. It is seeking to be a regional power and it will be expansionist regardless of its economic harms.

2. **China's growing economic power will render US economics irrelevant to it.**
Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, New Era Foreign Policy Project,
University of California, Berkeley, To the Editor, Foreign Affairs, June 2008, Lexis

This analysis misses the degree to which the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have, both domestically and internationally, effectively disaggregated economic and political liberalism. They have successfully orchestrated an economic ascendance that allows China to connect to the international economic order on its own terms. China's sheer economic might, in turn, has rendered the country far less susceptible to the political leverage the West has wielded over its economic partners in the past.

Con Blocks

A/T China is a peaceful ally.

1. China has demonstrated that it will continue to threaten US allies.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Similarly, China's maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there.

2. President Obama's policies have only made China more aggressive.

Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, The Problem With the Pivot Subtitle: Obama's New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, Foreign Affairs, December 2012, Lexis

Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters -- the other claimants have been active in these waters for years -- and the PLA formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands. As all these events suggest, the Obama administration's pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone.

PRO CASE #1
PREFLOW

Interdependence

**Our first contention
is that China and the
US are heavily
economically
interdependent.**
Morrison & Labonte

**Second, this
interdependence
means that China
will act in its self-
interest to make sure
that the US economy
prosper.**
Pennington

**Finally,
interdependence
ensures that China
will not threaten the
US.**
Tran

PRO CASE #2
PREFLOW

Cooperation

**First, China's
growth will be equal
to the US's growth.
So China will not be
able to overpower
the US.**

Babones

**Second, China is so
far behind the US
that China could not
serious challenge the
US.**

Babones

**Third, the increased
strength of China
will make it a more
effective partner for
the US in tackling
international issues.**

Ikenberry

CON CASE #1
PREFLOW

Nationalism

**First, unchecked
nationalism is
growing in China.
As it gets stronger,
the government will
capitulate to
nationalists'
demands to try to
take over Taiwan.**
Grammaticas

**Second, as energy
resources become
more scarce,
nationalists will
increase pressure on
the Chinese
government to take
action against the
US.** Grammaticus

**Third, conflict over
Taiwan would result
in a nuclear war.**
Moore

CON CASE #2
PREFLOW

Mearsheimer

**First, China's rise
will cause the US
and its allies to
counterbalance
China.**
Mearsheimer

**Second, China will
counteract
counterbalancing by
pushing the US out
of Asia.**
Mearsheimer

**Finally, there is
already proof in the
status quo that
China and the US
will engage in a
destructive security
competition as
China continues to
rise.**
Mearsheimer